How would the frontier have evolved in the absence of homestead policies? I apply a matrix completion method to predict the counterfactual time-series of frontier state capacity had there been no homesteading. In placebo tests, the matrix completion method outperforms synthetic controls and other regression-based estimators in terms of minimizing prediction error. Causal estimates signify that homestead policies had significant and long-lasting negative impacts on state government expenditure and revenue. These results are similar to difference-in-difference estimates that exploit variation in the timing and intensity of homestead entries aggregated from 1.46 million individual land patent records.
Political scientists are increasingly interested in patterns of state development across time and place. Several scholars (e.g., Bensel, 1990; Murtazashvili, 2013; Frymer, 2014) theorize a relationship between mid-nineteenth century public land policies and the development of the state, arguing that policies designed to transfer public land to private individuals increased the bureaucratic capacity of the U.S. federal government to administer land.
Public land policies had long-lasting impacts on state capacity, or the ability of governments to finance and implement policies (Besley and Persson, 2010) . I explore the role of two U.S. public land policies in shaping state capacity: the Homestead Act (HSA) of 1862, which opened for settlement hundreds of millions of acres of western frontier land, and the Southern Homestead Act (SHA) of 1866, which opened over 46 million acres of land for homesteading.
I provide evidence that homesteads authorized under these laws had significant long-run impacts on the capacity of frontier state governments.
The view that the western frontier had long-lasting impacts on the evolution of democratic institutions can be traced to Turner (1956 ). Turner's "frontier thesis" posited that homestead policies acted as a "safety valve" for relieving pressure from congested urban labor markets in eastern states. The view of the frontier as a "safety valve" has been explored by Ferrie (1997) , who finds evidence in a linked census sample of substantial migration to the frontier by unskilled workers and considerable gains in wealth for these migrant workers. Homestead policies not only offered greater economic opportunities to eastern migrants, but also the sparse population on the western frontier meant that state and local governments competed with each other to attract migrants in order to lower local labor costs and to increase land values and tax revenues. Frontier governments offered migrants broad access to cheap land and property rights, unrestricted voting rights, and a more generous provision of schooling and other public goods (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005) . García-Jimeno and Robinson (2008) test the frontier thesis in a global context and conclude that the economic effect of the frontier depends on the quality of political institutions at the time of frontier expansion. Frontier expansion promotes equitable outcomes only when societies are initially democratic. When institutional quality is weak, the existence of frontier land can yield worse developmental outcomes because non-democratic political elites can monopolize frontier lands. Historical scholars have noted that public land policies were often exploited by land speculators, ranchers, miners, and loggers, to accumulate public land and extract natural resources during the early stages of capitalist development (Gates, 1942; Murtazashvili, 2013) . According to this view, homesteading laws were de jure social polices but de facto corporate welfarism.
The paper makes a methodological contribution in applying an alternative method for estimating causal impacts of policy interventions on time-series cross-section data. Building on a new literature that uses machine learning algorithms such as L1-regularized linear regression (Doudchenko and Imbens, 2016) or deep neural networks (Poulos, 2017) for counterfactual prediction, I apply a matrix completion method to predict the treated unit timeseries in the absence of the intervention. I perform placebo tests and find that the matrix completion method outperforms the synthetic control method and other regression-based estimators in terms of minimizing prediction error. In addition, I show how to evaluate the overall effect of the policy intervention using a randomization inference procedure in which approximately unbiased p-values are obtained under minimal assumptions.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I overview the historical context of homestead policies and its relationship to state capacity and land inequality; Section 3 describes the method of matrix completion for counterfactual prediction, benchmarks the method against alternative estimators, and describes the inferential procedure. In Section 4, I report the results of placebo tests to verify the consistency of the matrix completion estimator. I then present estimates of the long-run impacts of homestead policies on state capacity. Section 5 reports DID estimates of the effect of homesteads on state capacity and land inequality, and Section 6 concludes.
Historical background
The 1862 HSA opened up hundreds of millions of acres of western public land for settlement.
The HSA provides that any adult citizen -including women, immigrants who had applied for citizenship, and freed slaves following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment-could apply for a homestead grant of 160 acres of frontier land. Applicants were required to live and make improvements on the land for five years before filing to claim a homestead land grant.
Under the HSA, the bulk of newly surveyed land on the western frontier was reserved for homesteads, although the law did not end sales of public land. The explicit goal of the HSA was to liberalize the homesteading requirements set by the Preemption Act of 1841, which permitted individuals already inhabiting public land to purchase up to 160 acres at $1.25 per acre before the land was put up for sale. The implicit goal was to promote rapid settlement on the western frontier and reduce federal government's enforcement costs (Allen, 1991) .
In the pre-Reconstruction South, public land was not open to homestead but rather unrestricted cash entry, which permitted the direct sale of public land to private individuals of 80 acres or more for at least $1.25 an acre. The 1866 SHA restricted cash entry and reserved for homesteading over 46 million acres of public land, or about one-third of the total land area in the five southern public land states (PLS) (Lanza, 1999, pp. 13) . PLS are states created out of the public domain. In the South, these states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Western PLS include the 25 states that comprise the Midwestern, Southwestern, and Western U.S. (except Hawaii).
Homestead policies were often exploited by speculators and corporations through fraudulent filings. Speculators and corporations engaged in the practice of paying individuals to stake out homesteads in order to extract resources from the land with no intention of filing for the final patent. In the South, these "dummy entry-men" were used by timber and mining companies to extract resources while the cash entry restriction of the SHA was in effect.
When the restriction was removed, there was no need for fraudulent filings because the larger companies could buy land in unlimited amounts at a nominal price (Gates, 1940 (Gates, , 1979 . The same pattern of fraudulent filings existed in the West, where Murtazashvili (2013) argues that speculators benefited disproportionately from public land policies because the economic balance of power tilted toward the wealthy. Gates (1942) characterizes western speculators who bought land in bulk prior to the 1889 restriction as being influential in state and local governments, resistant to paying taxes, and opposed to government spending.
Matrix completion for counterfactual prediction
An important problem in the social sciences is estimating the effect of a binary intervention on an outcome over time. When interventions take place at an aggregate level (e.g., a state), researchers make causal inferences by comparing the post-intervention ("post-period") outcomes of affected ("treated") units against the outcomes of unaffected ("control") units.
A common approach to the problem is the synthetic control method, which predicts the counterfactual outcomes of treated units by finding a convex combination of control units that match the treated units in term of lagged outcomes. Correlations across units that are assumed to remain constant over time.
This paper applies the method of matrix completion via nuclear norm minimization (MC-NNM) proposed by Athey et al. (2017) to predict counterfactual outcomes. Matrix completion methods (e.g., Mazumder et al., 2010) exploit correlations within and across units, but ignore the temporal dimension of the data. These methods typically assume missing values are sampled uniformly at random (Yoon et al., 2018) ; in contrast, the MC-NNM estimator allows for patterns of missing data to have a time-series dependency structure.
Let Y denote a N × T matrix of outcomes for each unit i = 1, . . . , N at time t = 1, . . . , T.
Y is incomplete because we observe each element Y it for only the control units and the treated units prior to time of initial treatment exposure, T 0 . Let O denote the set of (it) values that are observed and M the set of (it) missing values. Let the values of the N × T complete matrix M be M it = 1 if (it) ∈ M and M it = 0 if (it) ∈ O. Note that the process that generates M is referred to the assignment mechanism in the causal inference literature (Imbens and Rubin, 2015) and the missing data mechanism in missing data analysis (Little and Rubin, 2014) .
We cannot directly observe counterfactual outcomes and we instead wish to impute missing values in Y for treated units with M it = 1. In an observational setting, units are part of the assignment mechanism that generates M and patterns of missing data follow one of two specific structures. In the case of simultaneous adoption of treatment, a subset of units are exposed to treatment at time T 0 and every subsequent period. The second structure arises from the staggered adoption setting, where T 0 may vary across treated units. In either case, there are selection biases because the probability of missingness may depend on the unobserved data. The goal is to accurately estimate the effect of a policy intervention despite incomplete data subject to selection bias.
Matrix completion estimator
Matrix completion methods attempt to impute missing entries in a low-rank matrix by solving a convex optimization problem via NNM, even when relatively few values are observed in Y (Candès and Recht, 2009; Candes and Plan, 2010) . The MC-NNM estimator is
where L * a low-rank matrix to be estimated, X is a N × P matrix of normalized, unit-specific covariates, and γ * and δ * are vectors of unit and time effects, respectively. The identifying condition is that, conditional on L * , the error vector is independent across rows (units)
Estimating L * involves minimizing the sum of squared errors via nuclear norm regularized least squares:
where λ is the regularization term on the nuclear norm · -i.e., sum of singular values -and its value is selected by cross-validation. The algorithm for (2) iteratively replaces missing values with those recovered from a singular value decomposition (SVD) (Mazumder et al., 2010) . Amjad et al. (2018) propose an alternative approach of approximating L * via SVD, and then using linear regression on the "de-noised" matrix, rather than relying on matrix norm regularizations.
Athey et al. (2017) note two drawbacks of the MC-NNM estimator: first, it penalizes the errors for each value with M it = 0 equally without regard to the fact that Pr(M it ) = 1 (i.e., the propensity score) increases with t. Second, the columns of may be autocorrelated because the estimator does not account for time-series dependencies in the observed data.
Simulations
In this section, I evaluate the accuracy of the MC-NNM estimator on the following three datasets common to the synthetic control literature, with the actual treated unit removed from each dataset: Abadie and Gardeazabal's (2003) 
Hypothesis testing
Consider a setup with J control units indexed by i = 1, . . . , J and Q treated units indexed by i = J + 1, . . . , N. The optimization program (2) imputes the missing entries in Y : The inferred causal effect of the intervention on the treated group is the difference between the observed outcomes of the treated units and the counterfactual outcomes that would have been observed in the absence of the intervention,
Taking the difference-in-means between treated unit observed outcomes and predicted outcomes gives the per-period estimated average causal effect across treated units:
Chernozhukov et al. (2017) 
where T = T − T 0 and q is a constant.
Lettingα π denote the vector of per-period average causal effects estimated for each permutation π ∈ Π, the randomization p-value iŝ
where I(·) denotes the indicator function.
Following Chernozhukov et al. (2017) , (5) is estimated by permuting Y across the time dimension. The idea for permuting time periods rather than treatment assignment, as proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) , is that if the data are stationary and weakly dependent, which is often the case in an aggregate time-series setting, then the distribution of the error term in (1) should be the same in the pre-and post-periods. Chernozhukov et al. (2017) (Sylla et al., 1993) and the records of 16 state governments during the period of 1933 to 1937 (Sylla et al., 1995a,b) . Comparable measures for 48 states are drawn from U.S. Census special reports for the years 1902 years , 1913 years , 1932 years , 1942 years , 1962 years , 1972 years , and 1982 years (Haines, 2010 .
The expenditure measure includes state government spending on education, social welfare programs, and transportation. The revenue measure incorporates state government income streams such as tax revenue and non-tax revenues such as land sales.
The data pre-processing steps are as follows. Each measure is inflation-adjusted according to the U.S. Consumer Price Index (Williamson, 2017) and scaled by the total free population in the decennial census (Haines, 2010) . When estimating (1), unit-specific covariates include state-level average farm sizes measured in the 1860 and average farm values measured in the 1850 and 1860 censuses. In theory, we should expect that homesteaders migrate to more productive land and thus excluding these pre-period measures of agricultural productivity may result in overestimating the actual impact of homestead policies. To control for selection bias arising from differences in access to frontier lands, I create a measure of railroad access using digitized railroad maps provided by Atack (2013) , which contain information on the year that each rail line was built. Overlaying the railroad track map over historical county borders, I calculate the total miles of operational track per square mile and aggregate the measure to the state-level.
Placebo tests
Prior to presenting the main results, I assess the validity of the key assumption underlying the approach by discarding post-period observations from the data. Treating t = {1, . . . , T 0 − τ } as the pre-period, I estimate (4) and test the zero effect null hypothesis
where τ ∈ {1, 10, 25} and q ∈ {1, 2}. significance level of α = 0.05, regardless of the value of q or permutation structure. These results provide evidence in favor that the model is correctly specified. However, we can only reject the null in the case of τ = 1 when considering the expenditure outcome. 
Main estimates
In the main analyses, I fit the MC-NNM estimator described in (1) These per-period causal impacts are plotted in the bottom panels, with 95% confidence intervals estimated by takingα t ± 1.96 the standard error of the distribution of 1,000 block bootstrap replicates ofα t , with optimal block lengths selected by the procedure described by Politis and White (2004) .
The per-period impact time-series for both outcomes are essentially zero during the preperiod and within the bounds of the bootstrap confidence intervals, which demonstrates that the model is closely fitting the pre-period observations. Per-period impacts on state government spending peak in 1870, at the same time most PLS were first exposed to homesteads, The estimated bootstrap confidence intervals are useful for evaluating per-period causal impacts but are not helpful in evaluating the overall effect of homestead policies. Table 2 reports the results of testing the null hypothesis:
In the table, S q (α) corresponds to the test statistic described in (4) and each value beneath is the randomization p-value corresponding to each permutation structure. We can reject the null hypothesis (7) at the 5% level for both outcomes, both values of q, and all three permutation schemes. Note that the relevant test statistic S(α t ) measures the trajectory of average causal effects in absolute terms and thus does not provide information on the direction or evolution of the causal effects over time. , observed treated; , observed control; , counterfactual treated; , α t .
DID estimation
The matrix completion approach estimates the impact of a binary exposure to treatment on a continuous outcome. However, in this application a continuous form of treatment is available in the form of homestead entries. Equation (8) estimates a continuous version of the DID estimator described in Section 3.2, where the first difference comes from variation in the date of initial exposure to homesteads, and the second difference comes from variation in the intensity of homestead entries:
In this model, X is a matrix of unit-and time-varying covariates included to control for parallel trends in agricultural productivity and access to frontier lands. Entries in the treat- to reliably estimate the data generating process. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that the stratified bootstrap can be used to compute consistent standard errors when the number of units is sufficiently large.
Similar to the case of binary treatment, the continuous DID estimator is adapted to a setting of staggered adoption because the initial date of exposure to homesteads varies across PLS. It should be emphasized that estimating (8) in a staggered adoption setting relies on several strong assumptions regarding both the assignment mechanism -in this application, the distribution of T 0 -and the counterfactual outcomes of the treated units. The frame-work of Athey and Imbens (2018) , for instance, assumes the distribution of T 0 is completely random conditional on the covariates. In the current application, this assumption ignores the possibility that initial exposure to homesteads might be determined by unobserved factors. The framework also that the counterfactual outcomes at time t does not depend on the future date of treatment exposure if t < T 0 or the history of treatment exposure if t > T 0 .
Violations of these assumptions would arise if the homestead policies is anticipated prior to T 0 or if the size of frontier state government is determined by whether the state was exposed early or late to homesteads.
DID estimates on state capacity
I estimate (8) Figure 2 and are potentially overoptimistic due to serial correlation in the DID regression errors. Galor et al. (2009) propose a model where wealthy landowners block education reforms because education favors industrial labor productivity and decreases the value in farm rents. Inequality in this context can be thought of as a proxy for the amount of de facto political influence elites have to block reforms and limit the capacity of the state (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008) .
To test whether homesteads affected future land inequality in frontier counties, I calculate a commonly-used measure of land inequality based on the Gini coefficient of census farm sizes. Gini-based land inequality measures are commonly used as proxy for the de facto bargaining power of landed elites (e.g., Boix, 2003; Ziblatt, 2008; Ansell and Samuels, 2015) .
Note that the Gini coefficient will underestimate land inequality in counties with high shares of propertyless farmers because tenant farms are included in the farm size data, which is problematic because farms can be operated by different tenants but owned by the same landlord. I correct for this problem by adjusting the farm Gini coefficient by the ratio of farms to adult males, as recommended by Vollrath (2013) .
In Figure SM -5, a bivariate regression model yields a positive relationship between land inequality and state government finances during the period of 1860 to 1950, especially at higher levels of inequality. This relationship points to inequality as a potential causal mechanism underlying the relationship between homesteads and state capacity. The inverse relationship agrees with the findings of Ramcharan (2010) and Vollrath (2013) in the context of taxes, revenues, and public school spending at the county-level in 1890 and 1930. points.
Conclusion
The findings of this paper signify that mid-nineteenth century homestead policies had longlasting impacts that can potentially explain contemporary differences in state government capacity. MC-NNM and DID estimates imply that homestead policies -or the homestead entries authorized by those policies -had significant and negative impacts on state government expenditure and revenue that lasted a century following its implementation. The direction of these estimates contradicts the view that frontier state governments sought to increase public investments in order to attract eastern migrants following the passage of the HSA, and that homesteads would increase state and local tax bases. Instead, the results conform with the view that homestead policies were exploited by land speculators and natural resource companies and that the rents from public land were appropriated by the private sector.
I explore land inequality as a possible causal mechanism underlying the relationship between land reform and state capacity. First, I provide evidence of a positive relationship between land inequality and state government finances and that the slope of correlation increases at higher levels of inequality. A nonlinearity in the relationship between inequality and state capacity can arise in theoretical models that incorporate economic differences in political influence: greater income inequality reduces investments in fiscal capacity when elites have a monopoly on political power, however when inequality gets too high, the poor can impose redistribution through majority voting. Second, I present DID estimates that reveal per-capita homesteads significantly lowered land inequality in frontier states; although, the magnitude of the effect is negligible.
This paper makes a methodological contribution in applying matrix completion -a machine learning method commonly used for user recommendation tasks -for estimating causal impacts of policy interventions on time-series cross-sectional data. The promise of the method is three-fold. First, the method can be easily understood within the frameworks of modern causal inference and missing data imputation: we cannot directly observe the counterfactual outcomes of treated units and wish to impute these values on the basis of the observed values. Second, the method allows for patterns of missing data to have a time-series dependency structure and is thus adaptable to settings with staggered treatment adoption.
Third, the method outperforms several other regression-based estimators in a battery of placebo tests. The performance advantage can be attributed to the fact that it is capable of using additional information in the form of pre-period observations of the treated units, whereas other estimators rely only on the pre-period observations of control units to predict counterfactuals.
Further research is needed to determine the conditions under which consistency holds.
Estimator consistency is required to obtain approximately unbiased p-values under the randomization inference procedure. 
